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NOTES 
HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT SEVERED THE INDIAN CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT FROM FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
PRECEDENT UNDER THE GUISE OF TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Morgan Medders
*
 
I. Introduction 
Two competing interests dominate the interplay between federal Indian 
law and individual civil rights. On one hand, the U.S. government uplifts 
tribal sovereignty and recognizes the importance of tribal self-governance, 
and nowhere is this more special than setting the guidelines for tribal 
membership. On the other hand, the individual liberties that the Bill of 
Rights secures must be conferred to everyone. The most recent display of 
this tension was demonstrated in Tavares v. Whitehouse.
1
 Attempting to 
reconcile the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights while carefully 
respecting tribal sovereignty, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(“ICRA”).2 Generally, the Act extends most, but not all, of the Bill of 
Rights to Indian tribes, and thus requires that tribes provide these standards 
to their citizens. Among the provisions, the ICRA carves out a small 
pathway for habeas corpus relief, allowing tribal citizens to seek review in 
federal court for confinement.
3
  
Quite often, unfortunately, claims under the ICRA generate tension 
between tribal sovereignty and civil rights. After the ICRA’s enactment, 
questions arose as to how federal courts would interpret the habeas 
provision of the Act. This Note focuses on one of those questions. In 2017, 
several plaintiffs raised the issue of whether their temporary exclusion from 
tribal land constituted a detention for purposes of the ICRA.
4
 Jessica 
Tavares, along with three other plaintiffs, brought suit in federal court 
under the ICRA against the Tribal Council of the United Auburn Indian 
Community (“UAIC”) and sought habeas relief from the Tribe’s decision 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2012). 
 3. Id. § 1303; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).  
 4. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 867-69. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
424 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
 
to, among other things, temporarily exclude them from tribal land.
5
 They 
presented two arguments to the court: first, that the UAIC’s decision to 
withhold per capita payments created a basis for habeas review; second, and 
most importantly, that the UAIC’s decision to exclude petitioners from 
tribal lands established federal jurisdiction.
6
 The Eastern District of 
California rejected these arguments and dismissed the claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under the ICRA.
7
 The Ninth Circuit ultimately 
affirmed.
8
 This Note examines how the Ninth Circuit resolved this 
contention in the Tavares opinion.  
Tavares is an important benchmark in the relationship between self-
determination and federal civil rights legislation relating to tribes. While 
this Note is an evaluation of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the petitioners 
have filed for a writ of certiorari as of September 2017. The facts of this 
case fall somewhere in between the groups of cases where federal courts 
have found habeas jurisdiction adequate to evaluate a tribe’s confinement of 
its own members and where courts have clearly deemed it inappropriate. 
While the Tavares court could have allowed petitioners a chance to 
vindicate their civil rights claim in federal court, it postulated this as 
antithetical to Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
9
 in that doing so would open 
the floodgates for tribal members seeking federal habeas review. 
Contemplating big picture ramifications on tribal governance and tribes’ 
sovereignty to render binding judgments on tribal members, the court took a 
heightened stance on the ICRA’s grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction 
and improperly foreclosed habeas review in this instance. Here, the Ninth 
Circuit proclaimed that the ICRA’s federal habeas relief provision calls for 
a greater standard than the federal habeas corpus statute, and that relief 
extends to only those circumstances amounting to true physical 
confinement. While rationalizing that reversing an instance of temporary 
exclusion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may provide justice for the 
individual, the court deferred towards preservation of tribal autonomy to set 
forth the specifications for membership.  
Therefore, says the Ninth Circuit, in the interest of self-governance, 
tribal members facing temporary exclusion cannot invoke federal habeas 
jurisdiction because it is insufficient under the ICRA’s detention standard. 
Tavares contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s previous decisions equating the 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. at 869. 
 6. Id. at 870-71. 
 7. Id. at 869. 
 8. Id. at 878. 
 9. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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ICRA with the federal custody standard and improperly decided that 
petitioners did not suffer a severe restraint on liberty. 
II. Law Before the Case 
Prior to the enactment of the ICRA, tribes operated on their own sense of 
fundamental rights, which many tribes supplemented through adoption of 
various pieces of the Bill of Rights.
10
 The first landmark Supreme Court 
case involving the relationship between Indian tribes and the Bill of Rights 
was Talton v. Mayes.
11
 Talton involved the murder of two members of the 
Cherokee tribe on Cherokee land.
12
 The defendant argued that his 
indictment by a small grand jury was unconstitutional and invoked the Fifth 
Amendment as his defense.
13
 Rejecting the defendant’s federal habeas 
petition and the right of the defendant to avail himself under the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court proclaimed broadly that the United States 
Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes.
14
  
The reaction to Talton was significant. Members of the United States 
government were shocked by the notion that Indian Country did not fall 
under the ambit of the Constitution. Over time, Congress developed an 
interest in uniformly binding tribes and their members to the same 
constitutional principles binding the federal government.
15
 In 1968, 
Congress solidified this interest with the passage of ICRA. The Act extends 
most of the Bill of Rights to tribes, as well as the principles of equal 
protection and due process.
16
 While the text of these provisions was the 
same as those in the U.S. Constitution, the ICRA did not extend the 
underlying precedents along with them. Therefore, Indian tribes have 
largely been free to interpret the ICRA’s Bill of Rights in their own way. 
As a result, traditional tribal notions of justice embedded themselves into 
interpretations of the ICRA.  
Further, while Congress did not want to encroach on tribal self-
governance, it still provided a narrow means of redress for judgments 
through habeas corpus relief.
17
 With respect to habeas jurisdiction, the Act 
                                                                                                             
 10. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.04, at 979-80 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
 11. 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 12. Id. at 379. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 382-83. 
 15. COHEN, supra note 10, § 14.04, at 980-81. 
 16. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
 17. Id. § 1303. 
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provides that “[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available 
to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his 
detention by order of an Indian tribe.”18 This provision of the ICRA is 
significant in later jurisprudence. 
A. Background of ICRA’s Interpretation 
The ICRA was enacted in 1968 at the end of the Termination Era.
19
 The 
Act was, in large part, a response to the salience of Congress’s interest in 
overseeing some aspects of tribal criminal procedure.
20
 Namely, Congress 
sought to respond to tribal exemptions from federal constitutional 
restraints.
21
 Horror stories arose about gross injustice taking place in Indian 
Country.
22
 The fear, although largely pretextual, was that tribal 
governments were enforcing judgments against their members in ways not 
constitutionally permissible in state or federal courts. Ironically, while 
Congress was concerned about Indian tribes committing civil rights 
violations against their members, state and local governments committing 
violations posed the greater danger. Several tribal members testified before 
Congress as to this notion.
23
  
The ICRA is codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303. Section 1301 contains 
a definitional section,
24
 which defines for purposes of the Act: “Indian 
tribe,” “powers of self-government,” “Indian court,” and “Indian.” Section 
1302 is where the Act incorporates piecemeal provisions of the Bill of 
Rights through which Congress sought to limit the actions of tribal 
governments.
25
 In particular, this section incorporates all of the First 
Amendment without the Establishment Clause,
26
 the entire Fourth 
Amendment, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. 
 19. For background on the Termination Era, see COHEN, supra note 10, § 1.06, at 84-93. 
 20. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 
82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1346 (1969). 
 21. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 865 (2017). 
 22. DAVID GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 380 (6th 
ed. 2011). 
 23. Id. 
 24. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012). 
 25. Id. § 1302. 
 26. The Establishment Clause was not included because tribes enjoy the right to 
establish an official religion; notably, the Pueblo tribal structure is fundamentally Catholic. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/6
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Amendment,
27
 and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the ICRA imposes a sentencing cap that 
prohibits Indian tribes from imposing prison sentences greater than one-
year and also includes respective fine limits.
28
 Congress’s rationale behind 
instituting this cap was to keep tribal courts fixed as misdemeanor courts 
and allow the federal government to handle the more expensive 
prosecutions.  
Finally, § 1303 establishes federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. It states: 
“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, 
in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order 
of an Indian tribe.”29 Habeas relief for tribal members is certainly not a 
novel concept.
30
 After the ICRA’s enactment, it was not long before 
plaintiffs began seeking relief under the statute. The question, however, was 
what type of relief the ICRA provided.  
This question was addressed in perhaps the most significant Indian civil 
rights case: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
31
 In Santa Clara Pueblo, 
petitioners brought a claim under the ICRA questioning the Santa Clara 
Pueblo’s membership ordinance that denied membership to the descendants 
of female members who married outside of the Tribe.
32
 The petitioners 
brought their claim under 25 U.S.C. § 1302, but the Supreme Court notably 
concluded that while normally federal statutes authorize a private right of 
action, such a right does not exist in regard to the ICRA.
33
 Put another way, 
Congress did not manifest a clear intent to create a civil right of action 
under the ICRA.
34
 Instead, the Court’s only mechanism for review under 
the ICRA exists in § 1303.
35
 Even criminal review is limited to only habeas 
corpus.
36
  
                                                                                                             
 27. Some components of the Sixth Amendment were not implemented because they 
would pose financial burdens on tribes. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 
(1978). 
 28. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B)-(D) with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8). This 
sentencing cap is the reason why the Act omits “life” in its Equal Protection and Due 
Process clauses. 
 29. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. 
 30. See generally United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. 
Neb. 1879). 
 31. 436 U.S. 49. 
 32. Id. at 52-53. 
 33. Id. at 72. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 67. 
 36. Id. 
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In summary, the Court rationalized that a private right of action does not 
exist under § 1302’s Bill of Rights incorporations because the § 1303 
habeas provision exists. Otherwise, Congress would not have placed the § 
1303 provision in the ICRA. Finally, the Santa Clara Pueblo Court 
acknowledged that even though a § 1302 private right of action does not 
exist for tribal members, the federal government can bring a claim against a 
tribe under § 1302 to enforce provisions of the Bill of Rights against the 
tribes.
37
 Unfortunately, this scenario has never occurred and is likely to 
never happen.  
The ICRA’s nearly identical language to the Bill of Rights does not 
necessarily mean that tribal incorporations mirror federal precedent. Indeed, 
tribes formulate their own standards of Due Process and Equal Protection.
38
 
The bottom line in Santa Clara Pueblo is that by not allowing a private 
right of action, the federal government gives great deference to the 
“tribalized” interpretations of the Bill of Rights. Though the ICRA is 
chronologically a Termination Era piece of legislation, the Court’s decision 
in Santa Clara Pueblo clarifies its status as a self-determination mechanism 
for deference. Ultimately, because habeas jurisdiction is the only 
mechanism for tribal citizens to have their rights vindicated under the 
ICRA, plaintiffs began arguing for broader definitions of detention in order 
to squeeze their claims into federal court. 
B. What Constitutes a Detention for Habeas Purposes 
Limited to the narrow § 1303 mechanism, the issue for plaintiffs became 
determining what constitutes a detention under the ICRA. Various federal 
circuit courts attempted to answer that question. First, the Second Circuit in 
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians determined where federal 
review of tribal convictions is undoubtedly appropriate as an outer limit.
39
 
In Poodry, the Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians permanently banished 
petitioners from tribal lands and stripped them of citizenship.
40
 Petitioners 
brought a claim under the ICRA and argued that their permanent 
banishment from tribal lands qualified as a detention meriting habeas 
corpus review.
41
 The court ultimately agreed and found that permanent 
banishment is a “severe restraint on liberty,” not “civil in nature.”42 Also 
                                                                                                             
 37. Id. at 72. 
 38. COHEN, supra note 10, § 14.03, at 943-44.  
 39. 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 40. Id. at 876.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 901, 888. 
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notable in Poodry is that petitioners lacked a tribal mechanism to appeal the 
judgment.
43
  
While permanent banishment is sufficiently serious, other tribal actions 
have not risen to the level of deserving federal jurisdiction. In Shenandoah 
v. Halbritter, members of the Oneida Nation brought suit against the 
Nation’s representative under the ICRA in response to the Tribe’s housing 
ordinance.
44
 The ordinance provided that the Tribe could inspect and 
eventually demolish homes noncompliant with building code standards.
45
 
Petitioners asserted that the representative was wielding this statute for 
harassment and intimidation and that this practice justified habeas corpus 
relief under the ICRA.
46
 The Second Circuit disagreed.
47
 Deciding that the 
ordinance was not sufficiently severe, the court reasoned that the statute and 
its effects were economic in nature and, “[a]s a general rule, federal habeas 
jurisdiction does not operate to remedy economic restraints.”48 
The Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Second Circuit’s rationale that 
permanent banishment constitutes sufficient unlawful detention for 
purposes of the ICRA. Jeffredo v. Macarro involved disenrolled members 
of the Pechanga Tribe suing for relief.
49
 The petitioners invoked Poodry 
and claimed that disenrollment was enough for habeas relief.
50
 Notably, the 
disenrollment in this case did not bring banishment with it. The court found 
this distinction critical, stating that “the potential threat of future eviction is 
not sufficient to satisfy the detention requirement of § 1303.”51 Further, 
disenrollment alone was not enough under the statute: “The detention 
requirement is designed to limit the availability of habeas review to cases of 
special urgency.”52 The most substantial takeaway from the case, however, 
was the Jeffredo court’s statement that the “detention” requirement in the 
ICRA is the same as the federal custody standard.
53
 
Santa Clara Pueblo also contemplated the policy rationales behind the 
ICRA’s § 1303 habeas provision as the only pathway for a tribal member to 
                                                                                                             
 43. Id. at 876.  
 44. 366 F.3d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 45. Id. at 91. 
 46. Id. at 90. 
 47. Id. at 92. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 599 F.3d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 50. Id. at 919. 
 51. Id. at 920. 
 52. Id. at 923 (internal quotations omitted). 
 53. Id. at 922. 
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vindicate a civil rights claim against the tribe in federal court.
54
 The Court 
noted that Congress had a desire “not to intrude needlessly on tribal self-
government” and in doing so only provided the habeas pathway to serve the 
dual statutory objectives of promoting the rights of individual tribal 
members and furthering Indian self-government.
55
 The principles 
expounded in Santa Clara Pueblo remain significant: in order for Indian 
tribes to retain sovereignty, they should remain largely free from the 
intrusive effects of judicial review and any such review should be carefully 
limited.
56
  
III. Statement of the Case 
A. Facts 
Petitioners Jessica Tavares, Donna Caesar, Barbara Suehead, and Dolly 
Suehead are four members of the United Auburn Indian Community 
(UAIC), a federally recognized Indian tribe.
57
 The UAIC is located in the 
Sierra Nevada foothills of Auburn, California, and is comprised of two 
tribes: the Miwok and Maidu Indians.
58
 It is a small community composed 
of roughly 170 members.
59
 The governing body of the community is a five-
member Tribal Council.
60
 Interactions between the Tribal Council and the 
petitioners gave rise to the action.  
The named plaintiff was a well-respected member of the UAIC.
61
 The 
trial court noted that she formally served as a Tribal Council chair, 
informally referred to as “chief,” and that the community held her opinions 
in high esteem.
62
 The situation escalated for the petitioners when they 
decided to speak out against the Tribal Council’s decisions; among other 
things, petitioners made allegations that the Tribal Council mismanaged its 
                                                                                                             
 54. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 70 (1978). 
 55. Id. at 71; see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). 
 56. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67. 
 57. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 58. About Us, UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY, https://www.auburnrancheria.com/ 
about (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 
 59. About Us: The Restoration Act, UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY, https://www. 
auburnrancheria.com/about/copy_of_the-land-trust (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).  
 60. About Us: Tribal Council, UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY, https://www. 
auburnrancheria.com/about/tribal-council (last visited Mar. 31, 2018). 
 61. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 878 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 62. Tavares v. Whitehouse, No. 2:13-CV-02101-TLN-CKD, 2014 WL 1155798, at *4 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
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finances and was dishonest in conducting elections.
63
 They gained 
substantial traction and eventually had these claims published in “non-tribal 
news outlets.”64  
Petitioners began a recall campaign.
65
 Under the procedures for recall, 
they needed to acquire signatures from forty percent of the UAIC.
66
 
Petitioners maintained that they did, in fact, meet this requirement, but the 
Community disputed this.
67
 Conveniently enough, the Tribal Council is also 
in charge of the Elections Committee that oversees this entire process.
68
 
The Tribal Council did not take well to the recall campaign and promptly 
notified the petitioners that they would be subject to disciplinary action and 
a potential withholding of per capita payments.
69
 The notices issued by the 
Council stated that the petitioners acted maliciously to slander and commit 
libel against the Tribe, and that the petitioners’ conduct of undermining the 
Council was harmful to tribal programs and business.
70
 The Council stated 
that petitioners acted in violation of tribal law.
71
 
Also included in the written notices was the result of the Tribal Council’s 
determination of how it chose to respond to petitioners’ conduct. The 
Council voted to issue two separate orders: (1) an order to withhold the 
petitioners’ per capita payments, and (2) an order to exclude petitioners 
from tribal lands and facilities.
72
 Petitioners were barred from all tribal 
events and could not attend tribal meetings.
73
 They could, however, vote by 
absentee ballot.
74
 The duration of each order varied between Tavares and 
the other petitioners: the exclusion order was for a period of ten years for 
Tavares and two years for the other three petitioners, while the per capita 
withholdings were for a period of four years for Tavares and six months for 
the other petitioners.
75
  
                                                                                                             
 63. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 867. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Tavares, 2014 WL 1155798, at *2. 
 66. Id. at *3. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at *4. 
 70. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 71. Id. at 868.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Tavares, 2014 WL 1155798, at *4. 
 74. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 868. 
 75. Id. 
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The UAIC provided a narrow pathway for petitioners to appeal the 
Council’s punishment, but only for the per capita withholdings.76 This was 
also facilitated through the Council itself.
77
 No mechanism existed for the 
petitioners to appeal the exclusion order.
78
 As a result of the appeal process, 
the UAIC reduced the withholdings by six months for Tavares and one 
month for the other petitioners.
79
  
The petitioners then brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the 
Eastern District of California, claiming they were denied due process and 
punished in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights.
80
 The 
trial court found that the restraint was severe but did not constitute 
“detention” under the ICRA.81 The case was dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.
82
 Petitioners appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
83
 
B. Decision 
The Analysis portion of the opinion begins by referencing two bedrock 
principles in Indian law: “tribal sovereignty and congressional primacy in 
Indian affairs.”84 With respect to tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes generally 
retain the sovereignty that existed prior to the genesis of the United States.
85
 
Tribal sovereignty was full and uncompromised until European nations 
discovered America.
86
 After Indian tribes were limited to an occupancy 
right over land, the Court placed further jurisdictional limitations on the 
tribes.
87
 The remaining aspects of sovereignty today, while not complete, 
                                                                                                             
 76. Tavares, 2014 WL 1155798, at *5.  
 77. Id. The Petitioners note this to be a due process concern. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at *10. 
 82. Id. at *12. 
 83. See Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 84. Id. at 869. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that upon 
discovery of the new world, the discovering European sovereign gets ownership of the 
underlying fee title to the discovered lands and the exclusive right to purchase the occupancy 
right of indigenous people). These are known respectively as the vesting of fee title and 
restraint on alienation clauses. In addition, the ownership of the underlying fee title extended 
to the United States after the Revolutionary War. 
 87. See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding 
that Indian tribal courts do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians); 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding the Major Crimes Act as 
constitutional).  
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still protect the principle that tribes, as sovereigns, ought to govern 
themselves.  
The United States Supreme Court pronounced the critical, and often 
contradicting, caveat that self-governance cannot be inconsistent with the 
guardian-ward relationship.
88
 Inherent sovereignty is reduced by 
congressional primacy in Indian affairs, otherwise known as Congress’s 
plenary power.
89
 The relationship between these two principles is 
essentially that “[t]ribal sovereignty offers a backdrop against which the 
applicable federal statutes must be read.”90 Because Congress enjoys such 
broad authority over tribal matters, federal courts hesitate to interpret any 
statute against tribal sovereignty unless Congress expresses clear intent to 
establish a limitation.
91
 
The first issue the Tavares court addressed was whether the UAIC’s 
withholding of petitioners’ per capita payments created federal habeas 
corpus jurisdiction.
92
 The court quickly answered in the negative.
93
 Per 
capita payments are “‘the distribution of money or other thing[s] of value to 
all members of the tribe, or to identified groups of members, which [are] 
paid directly from the net revenues of any tribal gaming activity.’”94 The 
court invoked two authorities to support its reasoning of why habeas 
jurisdiction was inappropriate for this issue. First, the court recognized the 
Second Circuit case, Shenandoah, as persuasive authority that economic 
penalties do not warrant federal habeas jurisdiction.
95
 Second, the court 
invoked a federal regulation that designates per capita disputes to tribal 
courts.
96
 Indeed, the court’s brevity on this issue makes it clear that 
withholding per capita payments is entirely within the UAIC’s sovereign 
authority and is insufficient to justify federal court review. The petitioner 
                                                                                                             
 88. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (noting that the tribes’ 
relationship with the United States resembles that of a ward to a guardian). This idea did not 
acquire legal force until Kagama. 
 89. See generally Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).  
 90. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 869 (quoting McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 
U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (internal quotations and ellipses omitted)).  
 91. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978). 
 92. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 870. 
 93. Id. 
 94. What Are Per Capita Payments?, MVSKOKE MEDIA (Jan. 27, 2017), https:// 
mvskokemedia.com/what-are-per-capita-payments/.  
 95. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 870. 
 96. Id. “You must utilize or establish a tribal court system, forum or administrative 
process for resolving disputes arising from the allocation of net gaming revenue and the 
distribution of per capita payments.” 25 C.F.R. § 290.23 (2000). 
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even acknowledged in oral argument that the case could not have been 
brought to federal court based on an economic benefit alone.
97
 
After addressing per capita payments, the court then considered the 
claims brought by petitioners Donna Caesar, Dolly Suehead, and Barbara 
Suehead separately from Tavares. Here, the Ninth Circuit found the 
doctrine of mootness barred their appeals because there was no longer a live 
controversy.
98
 The dissent agreed, but the petitioners disputed this in oral 
argument by claiming the orders have collateral consequences in the form 
of the stigma created by the Tribe referencing the orders in tribal 
publications.
99
  
 Next, the court addressed whether temporary exclusion orders are 
sufficiently serious for habeas jurisdiction. This is the key issue of the 
opinion. Normally, the requisite standard for determining habeas 
jurisdiction is when a person is “in custody,”100 but the ICRA uniquely uses 
“detention” instead.101 The court deemed this distinction to be a significant 
one because “detention” carries a meaning of stronger physical control.102 
Even more, the court referenced that members of Congress equated 
“detention” to imprisonment.103 This difference, critical to the Ninth 
Circuit, was enough to find that the ICRA calls for true, physical 
confinement, as opposed to the more open-ended “custody” standard of the 
federal habeas statute. 
With this initial understanding of “detention” under the ICRA, the court 
looked further to case law found in Poodry, Shenandoah, and Jeffredo. The 
Second Circuit in Poodry legitimized the ICRA habeas issue by being the 
first case where a federal circuit court found a tribal decision to be 
punishment outside of physical confinement—namely, permanent exclusion 
                                                                                                             
 97. Oral Argument at 28:23, Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 
14-15814), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000015567. 
 98. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 878. 
 99. Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 27:30. 
 100. Typically, the federal statute governing habeas relief is 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which 
provides: 
[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on 
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). 
 101. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 871. 
 102. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012). 
 103. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 873. 
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from tribal land—sufficient for habeas jurisdiction.104 Poodry received 
substantial attention. In particular, it left open the question of what other 
penalties might receive habeas jurisdiction under the ICRA. Two years 
later, Shenandoah attempted to foreclose this question by limiting Poodry 
only to permanent banishment.
105
 The Ninth Circuit took issue with the 
Second Circuit’s reluctance to distinguish disenrollment and banishment. 
Unlike the persuasive effects of Poodry and Shenandoah, Jeffredo 
presented precedent that the Tavares court implemented in its analysis: that 
federal habeas jurisdiction does not cover tribal membership disputes.
106
  
Relying strongly on Jeffredo and other authority, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that tribal sovereignty extends to decisions to exclude individual 
members from lands and facilities.
107
 The tribes alone should make 
decisions on membership and intrusion, with federal court review only 
undermining this inherent tribal function. According to the Tavares court, 
habeas relief is a difficult threshold to pass in this instance.
108
 Temporary 
exclusion is not as severe as the permanent banishment situation in Poodry 
and is therefore inadequate for habeas corpus. As a final point, the court 
noted that it does not look to diminish petitioners’ situation or the 
seriousness of the allegations against the respondent, but ultimately, 
petitioners can only seek redress in tribal courts.
109
  
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority for “[recalibrating] the 
balance” between tribal sovereignty and individual civil rights.110 The 
dissent states that ICRA “detention” should be interpreted the same as 
federal “custody” based on Jeffredo.111The dissent impresses that the 
individual interests at stake in the petitioners’ claims are critical.  
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. at 874.  
 105. Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 366 F.3d 89, 92 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
 106. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 875.  
 107. The last citation in the Tavares opinion invokes Fisher v. District Court, stating, 
“[E]ven if a jurisdictional holding occasionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum 
to which a non-Indian has access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because 
it is intended to benefit [his or her] class,” and further self-determination. Tavares, 851 F.3d 
at 878 (first alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 
(1976)). 
 108. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 876. 
 109. Id. at 878 (“[T]he petitioners’ remedy is with the Tribe, not in the federal courts.”). 
In other words, the fact that the tribe does not provide as robust of an appeal system for the 
petitioners to avail themselves is not of federal concern.  
 110. Id. at 880. 
 111. Id. 
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IV. Analysis 
The Ninth Circuit in Tavares excessively weighed the interests of the 
tribes in creating their own standards for membership against the interests 
of tribal members in having their rights vindicated in federal court. In this 
balancing act, Tavares unfortunately fell far against the individual’s right to 
habeas relief, leaving far-reaching implications in its wake for the 
individual civil rights of tribal citizens. Federal circuit courts, particularly 
the Second and Ninth Circuits, have given much credence to the word 
choice of “detention,” as opposed to “custody,” in the ICRA. This is 
contrary to how habeas relief is traditionally utilized in American law and 
how 25 U.S.C. § 1303 should work.  
Fundamentally, the ICRA detention standard should be interpreted the 
same as federal custody.
112
 The Ninth Circuit recognized this notion in 
Jeffredo but later ignored it in Tavares.
113
 Jeffredo realized that the standard 
for ICRA detention should be consistent with federal case law on what 
constitutes a severe restraint on liberty.
114
 The dissenting judge 
acknowledged this principle in oral argument.
115
 Despite this longstanding 
principle, Tavares was decided on the idea that the “detention” needed to be 
permanent, like the situation in Poodry, despite this being antithetical to 
federal case law.  
In the petition for a writ of certiorari, the petitioner’s question presented 
asks: “Should the ‘detention’ requirement for habeas review under the 
ICRA be construed ‘more narrowly than’ the ‘custody’ showing required 
under other federal habeas statutes?”116 The Ninth Circuit should have 
answered “no” when addressing this question. Undoubtedly, the UAIC as a 
tribe should do all it can to exercise tribal sovereignty and determine 
membership. The Supreme Court has reinforced this as fundamental.
117
 
However, it goes too far to say that tribes can strip tribal members of their 
membership, either temporarily or permanently,
118
 potentially without due 
process. Tavares foreclosed this scenario from reaching federal court by 
limiting a tribal member’s right to be heard until the punishment amounts to 
                                                                                                             
 112. See COHEN, supra note 10, § 9.09, at 780. 
 113. Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Compare Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 17:30, with Tavares, 851 F.3d at 871. 
 116. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tavares, 851 F.3d 863 (No. 14-15814), 2017 WL 
4251148. 
 117. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54 (1978). 
 118. Tavares provides an example of a temporary repeal of tribal membership, while 
Poodry provides an example of a permanent repeal of tribal membership. 
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physical detention. Santa Clara Pueblo is distinguishable here, as the Court 
did not contemplate facts that involved tribal members being stripped of 
their very identity; instead, the facts were limited to specifications for 
membership.
119
  
Federal habeas corpus’s “severe restraint on liberty” standard is not as 
strict as the standard proffered by the Ninth Circuit here. Indeed, federal 
courts allow habeas relief in several areas outside of contemporaneous 
physical detention. Examples of this include habeas where an individual is 
out on parole,
120
 or even where an individual is on probation.
121
 
More importantly, the petitioners here not only enjoy citizenship in the 
UAIC,
122
 an Indian tribe with foundations reaching past the birth of the 
United States, but they also enjoy citizenship in the United States. The very 
idea that tribal members retain both forms of citizenship is a key reason 
Congress enacted the ICRA. Just because the petitioners’ claim involves a 
tribal council decision does not mean they should be deprived of their right 
to federal habeas review. To the contrary, petitioners’ rights as Americans 
should predominate in this instance because their means of redress are 
narrowly limited, if available at all, to relief in federal court. 
Another reason federal habeas review was appropriate in Tavares is 
because it is permissive in other legal spheres. Non-Indians have used this 
device against state punishments frequently throughout history.
123
 In fact, 
habeas corpus relief has been granted in non-Indian contexts in non-
permanent circumstances.
124
 Because the right exists for non-Indians 
against enforcement of state laws, it is faulty to not also apply this to tribal 
members. In short, the “sufficiently serious” standard is interpreted more 
stringently when the petitioners are tribal members, even though American 
citizens should enjoy the same habeas rights irrespective of the jurisdiction 
where the detention takes place. In summary, the standard for habeas 
review against state government detentions should be the same for tribal 
                                                                                                             
 119. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 51. 
 120. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). 
 121. See United States ex rel. B. v. Shelly, 430 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 122. It is important to note that the enjoyment of membership occurred with the 
exception of the exclusion order discussed in this case. 
 123. See JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 293-305 (3rd ed. 
2017) (chapter 8). 
 124. Id. at 307. 
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governments. This would allow tribal citizens access to the federal criminal 
justice system they are entitled to enjoy as American citizens.
125
 
There should, no doubt, be a requirement to exhaust tribal court remedies 
to protect tribal sovereignty. Litigants should not be able to circumvent 
procedure where relief could perhaps be granted within the same tribe, but 
through a higher appellate process. Through this guideline, self-
determination becomes more adequately protected from the risks 
contemplated in Santa Clara Pueblo.  
Indeed, in cases where modes of appeal exist under a particular tribe’s 
jurisdiction, litigants should always explore those before seeking redress 
through habeas corpus. Here, petitioners did not have any further avenues 
for appeal or mechanisms of tribal review in the UAIC’s governmental 
structure. The Tavares court perhaps would have required exhaustion if 
UAIC methods of review did exist.
126
 This would have correctly advanced 
the aims of Santa Clara Pueblo that federal courts need not be 
overburdened by habeas petitions inconsistent with self-determination. But, 
the fact that petitioners did not have any way of appealing the exclusion 
orders speaks directly to a lack of due process. This concern is heightened 
by the fact that the Tribal Council passing the punishment in Tavares was 
the same body against whom petitioners were speaking out. When tribal 
members are punished by tribes that lack a robust system of appeal, such as 
the situation in Tavares, tribal members should be able to avail themselves 
to the ICRA’s 25 U.S.C. § 1303 habeas corpus provision for federal review.  
It is hard to reconcile the notion that ICRA relief should only result out 
of criminal prosecutions with the simple truth that many tribes, like the 
UAIC, do not have a criminal code or a criminal court.
127
 The UAIC 
punishment here is designated as civil in nature because the UAIC does not 
have a criminal code. The ICRA calls only for detention and is silent on a 
requirement for criminal prosecution.
128
 Furthermore, a potential criminal 
requirement would allow tribes to circumvent the possibility of federal 
habeas corpus by simply not creating criminal courts. In this scenario, tribal 
                                                                                                             
 125. See Brief of Andrea M. Seielstad, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 14-15814), 2017 WL 4857396. 
 126. Tavares, 851 F.3d at 873 (invoking ICRA legislative history memorandum by then 
House Minority Leader Gerald Ford discussing exhaustion requirement in state 
imprisonment contexts).  
 127. Id. at 874 n.12. The Tavares court declines to decide whether ICRA requires a 
criminal judgment, but the lack of a criminal prosecution does weigh heavy on the case. 
 128. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012). 
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governments could hypothetically impose any sentence on an individual 
member with federal habeas relief entirely foreclosed. 
The Ninth Circuit focused heavily on the duration of punishment to 
determine that federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking under the ICRA; 
specifically, that the Tavares temporary ban from lands and facilities does 
not equate to permanent banishment. In other words, if it is not permanent, 
then it is not severe. Yet the petitioners, like so many tribal citizens, place 
their entire cultural, personal, and professional identity in their tribe. To 
attach a requirement of permanence to exclusion is inconsistent with the 
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence standard of severity that should have 
been applied.
129
 While the Ninth Circuit claimed it did not seek to minimize 
petitioners’ situation, it perhaps did so by misunderstanding the significance 
that tribal members place in accessing tribal facilities and participating in 
the governmental process.
130
 Any sentence, regardless of duration, that 
deprives tribal members of their natural right to be members of a tribe 
should always be questionable and investigated through habeas relief.  
V. Conclusion 
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly decided that federal subject matter 
jurisdiction under the ICRA was lacking in this case. The ICRA’s 
“detention” requirement should be interpreted the same as the “custody” 
requirement in federal habeas corpus precedent. Holding that a severe 
restraint on liberty does not exist in Tavares will allow further civil rights 
abuses levied by tribes against individual members and will deprive tribal 
members of appropriate federal habeas corpus relief. 
 
                                                                                                             
 129. Habeas does not require permanent sentences. See PFANDER, supra note 123, at 293-
307. 
 130. See Oral Argument, supra note 97, at 26:27; see also id. at 25:40 (counsel for 
petitioner inquiring as to how exclusion order is any different from a private individual 
saying “we don’t want you at our party”). 
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